Tag Archives: Dobbs v Jackson

Dobbs Sentences #148: Part II C 1

Paragraph 6 of 6 Sentence 2 of 3 Another sentence with one claim: “Those criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F. 3d 1440, 1444 (CA9 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).” […]

Dobbs Sentences #147: Part II C 1

Paragraph 6 of 6 Sentence 1 of 3 The last paragraph of this section starts with a sentence consisting of a single claim: “These attempts to justify abortion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one’s ‘concept of existence’ prove too much. Casey, 505 U.S., at 851.” And I guess we’ll […]

Dobbs Sentences #146: Part II C 1

Paragraph 5 of 6 Sentence 3 of 3 This sentence is a single claim that continues the train of thought of the previous sentence: “Respondents and the Solicitor General also rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 […]

Dobbs Sentences #145: Part II C 1

Paragraph 5 of 6 Sentence 2 of 3 The second sentence in this paragraph is a cornucopia of citations: “Casey relied on cases involving the right to marry a person of a different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); […]

Dobbs Sentences #144: Part II C 1

Paragraph 5 of 6 Sentence 1 of 3 This paragraph opens with a single claim: “Nor does the right to obtain an abortion have a sound basis in precedent.” It will be interesting to see how the Court supports this claim. Until then, this is undetermined:

Dobbs Sentences #143: Part II C 1

Paragraph 4 of 6 Sentence 6 of 6 This paragraph concludes with a bold claim: “Our Nation’s historical understanding of ordered liberty does not prevent the people’s elected representatives from deciding how abortion should be regulated.” This requires support, and I don’t recall seeing any. This is undetermined:

Dobbs Sentences #142: Part II C 1

Paragraph 4 of 6 Sentence 5 of 6 This sentence is essentially the same claim with opposite specifics: “Voters in other States may wish to impose tight restrictions based on their belief that abortion destroys an ‘unborn human being.’ Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b).” One interesting element of this sentence, this claim, is that it references […]

Dobbs Sentences #141: Part II C 1

Paragraph 4 of 6 Sentence 4 of 6 This sentence is another simple claim: “In some States, voters may believe that the abortion right should be even more extensive than the right that Roe and Casey recognized.” Again, this claim is undoubtedly true, but my questions from the previous sentence remain: people will have different […]

Dobbs Sentences #140: Part II C 1

Paragraph 4 of 6 Sentence 3 of 6 The next sentence consists of a single uncontroversial claim: “But the people of the various States may evaluate those interests differently.” This is true. Without a doubt. It’s also true that the people of the various counties within a state “may evaluate those interests differently.” It’s also […]

Dobbs Sentences #139: Part II C 1

The next sentence is a single claim: “Roe and Casey each struck a particular balance between the interests of a woman who wants an abortion and the interests of what they termed ‘potential life.’ Roe, 410 U.S., at 150 (emphasis deleted); Casey, 505 U.S., at 852.” Let’s see what the citations show us. Here’s Roe […]