I never meant this to be a Dobbs blog, but so far that’s all I’ve posted about here. There’s a lot going on in the world now, and I’m shifting my attention accordingly. To better keep myself informed on day-to-day matters, and to access information as close to the source as I can, I’m going to start tracking the White House Press Briefings.
I don’t really have an agenda other than to monitor the quality of the information coming from the Press Secretary and the quality of the coverage by the reporters in the briefings.
I took a quick look at the most recent briefing on January 10, 2025, and here are some thoughts I had about what I saw:
About seventy questions were asked at this briefing, and the first twenty were addressed to FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell. These were all straightforward questions about the wildfires in the Los Angeles area, they were on point and answered directly.
The other fifty or so questions were the standard press briefing questions addressed to Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, and these are what interest me, with my focus on the quality of the questions asked and the quality of the answers (not just responses) to those questions.
One exchange stuck out to me. It was when a reporter asked about Russia policy. It stuck out because it seems like the reporter has a hard time getting a satisfying answer. This is the exchange:
Q: Going back to the Russia sanctions. Can you walk us through the thought process on this? Is — is this — the president-elect has obviously made clear his desire for some sort of deal to end the fighting.
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah.
Q: Is this trying to set the table for that by ratcheting up pressure on Russia? Another way of asking that is: Why not do this earlier than now?
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: I mean, look, this is — as I stated, this is a commitment that was made by the president and the G7 counterparts — his G7 counterparts. And we’ve always said that we were going to find ways to put pressure on Russia. We’ve always said that it is up to Russia to end this war. They can do it today.
And we’ve been, I think, pretty clear on that. We — this is not the first sanctions. We’ve done multiple sanctions over the past almost three years as this war has gone on.
And so, this was — you know, it wasn’t just us. This was also in coordination with our allies and partners. And so, that’s what you saw. You saw UK make an announcement as well.
And — but we’ve — we’ve been clear — we’ve been clear that we were going to take actions. And so, that’s what you see from — from this administration.
But this is not the first one. Right? We’ve done multiple, as I just stated, actions before, and we want to make sure that we hold Russia accountable here.
Q: But by definition, these are — you made the choice not to do these specific actions, which are pretty significant —
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah, they are significant.
Q: — for — for a —
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: You’re right.
Q: — couple of — couple of years. So, why now?
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Again, I just said —
Q: You know, why didn’t you do it a year ago?
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: No, I hear you.
Q: Why now? What changed?
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: And again, in my answer to you just moments ago, it’s not just us. This is also being done with our G7 counterparts. This is a — a — essentially, a group effort, and that’s what you’re seeing today.
Q: Thank you.
This is weird. The pronouns in the first question are vague and invite confusion.
Is this trying to set the table for that by ratcheting up pressure on Russia? Another way of asking that is: Why not do this earlier than now?
I’m assuming that “this” means the new sanctions on Russia. The “that” means “ratcheting up pressure on Russia,” which is the obvious objective of sanctions. Is this even a sensible question? Yes, the
sanctions are an effort to increase “pressure on Russia.” What else would it be?
So the first phrasing of the question is kind of stupid to begin with, but Jean-Pierre’s response doesn’t answer it. She can probably be forgiven, because maybe the appropriate answer would be to insult the reporter, but it’s a yes-or-no question, and there is neither “yes” nor “no” in the response.
But does her response address the second formulation of the question, which is “Why not [impose these sanctions] earlier than now?” Let’s look at her claims:
- [T]his is a commitment that was made by the president and the G7 counterparts — his G7 counterparts.
- [W]e’ve always said that we were going to find ways to put pressure on Russia.
- We’ve always said that it is up to Russia to end this war. They can do it today.
- [W]e’ve been, I think, pretty clear on that.
- We — this is not the first sanctions.
- We’ve done multiple sanctions over the past almost three years as this war has gone on.
- And so, this was — you know, it wasn’t just us.
- This was also in coordination with our allies and partners.
- And so, that’s what you saw. You saw UK make an announcement as well.
- And — but we’ve — we’ve been clear — we’ve been clear that we were going to take actions.
- And so, that’s what you see from — from this administration.
- But this is not the first one.
- We’ve done multiple, as I just stated, actions before, and we want to make sure that we hold Russia accountable here.
So of the thirteen statements in the response we finally get an answer with number five. “[T]his is not the first sanctions” is awkwardly spoken (I’m sure KJP would fix that verb if she could), but it reveals the rephrasing of the question is as pointless as the first.
This report1 from April of 2024 lays out sanctions the US has imposed on Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine going back to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 20122, which provides the framework that authorizes presidential action in this case. The specific impositions of sanctions since Russia’s “Special Military Operation” on February 24, 2022 include the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act3 and the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act4, both in April of 2022, and the Russia and Belarus SDR Exchange Prohibition Act of 20225 in October of 2022.
S&P Global has posted this exhaustive list6 of sanctions against Russia. The US appears on this list 14 times in 2024 alone, including this entry for February 24, 2024:
The US announces more than 500 new sanctions against Russia to mark the second anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine and following the death of opposition leader Aleksey Navalny, including against National Payment Card System JSC, the operator of the Mir payment system; banks including Avangard Joint Stock Bank and JSC Bank ChelindBank; and other individuals and companies connected to the financial, defense and procurements sectors. The measures announced by the US Treasury, Commerce and State Departments also targeted several gold miners, including PJSC Uzhuralzoloto, founder and majority owner Konstantin Ivanovich Strukov, and subsidiary LLC Sovrudnik, and PJSC Kommunarovskiy gold mine as well as mining investment firms and aluminum product-maker JSC Samara Metallurgical Plant.
That’s 500 sanctions in one shot. This flies in the face of the implication that the US hadn’t sanctioned enough prior to this most recent announcement, and maybe that’s not what the reporter was getting at. A more charitable interpretation of the question would be that these specific sanctions could have and should have been imposed earlier. Maybe that’s true. What are the sanctions in this latest announcement, then?
This is the Treasury Department’s press release7:
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury took sweeping action to fulfill the G7 commitment to reduce Russian revenues from energy, including blocking two major Russian oil producers. Today’s actions also impose sanctions on an unprecedented number of oil-carrying vessels, many of which are part of the “shadow fleet,” opaque traders of Russian oil, Russia-based oilfield service providers, and Russian energy officials. Today’s actions are underpinned by the issuance of a new determination that authorizes sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 against persons operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. These actions substantially increase the sanctions risks associated with the Russian oil trade.
That last part is the new bit. And what is Executive Order (E.O.) 140248? That’s actually an order President Biden issued in 2021. This new announcement just adds specific targets for the sanctions. This isn’t a new kind of sanction—it’s just an intensification of the strategy established years ago. So is the reporter wondering why these particular targets weren’t identified earlier?
Does it matter?
1https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6899#:~:text=%2F04%2F2022)-,Russia%20and%20Belarus%20SDR%20Exchange%20Prohibition%20Act%20of%202022,assistance%20to%20Russia%20or%20Belarus.
2https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10576#:~:text=Congress%20passed%20the%20Sergei%20Magnitsky,violations%20against%20individuals%20seeking%20to
3https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6968
4https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7108
5https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6899#:~:text=%2F04%2F2022)-,Russia%20and%20Belarus%20SDR%20Exchange%20Prohibition%20Act%20of%202022,assistance%20to%20Russia%20or%20Belarus.
6https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/sanctions-against-russia-8211-a-timeline-69602559
Cynical Jason 