As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

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Sentence 5 of 8

Three closely-related claims here:

“It fosters ‘evenhanded’ decisionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like manner. Payne, 501 U.S., at 827.”

• “[Stare decisis] fosters ‘evenhanded’ decisionmaking.”
• “[Stare decisis] requir[es] that like cases be decided in a like manner.”
• “[Stare decisis] fosters ‘evenhanded’ decisionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like manner.”

Since the point has been made that stare decisis isn’t an “inexorable command,” I feel like the word “requiring” misstates the reality here. At first glance I’d say this is at least doubtful, but let’s see what our old friend Payne has to offer:

“Stare decisis is the preferred course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 474 U. S. 265-266 (1986). Adhering to precedent “is usually the wise policy, because, in most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 285 U. S. 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, “this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 665 (1944).

I’ve cited some of this passage before, but didn’t focus on this point. The sentence that contains the key word in the Dobbs sentence is this one:

“Stare decisis is the preferred course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”

Nothing controversial there, and it doesn’t venture into the “requiring” problem that Dobbs does. That little addition changes the second claim. I have no trouble signing off on the first claim being true:

• “[Stare decisis] fosters ‘evenhanded’ decisionmaking.”

But the word “requiring” gives me pause on the other two, so I’m going to call those undetermined for now:

• “[Stare decisis] requir[es] that like cases be decided in a like manner.”
• “[Stare decisis] fosters ‘evenhanded’ decisionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like manner.”