As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

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I count two claims in this sentence:

“It ‘reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.’ Kimble, 576 U.S., at 455.”

The claims:

• “[Stare decisis] ‘reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents,’”
• “[Stare decisis] ‘sav[es] parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.’”

Another partial definition of stare decisis. The citation in Kimble first references Payne before delivering the relevant phrase:

“Overruling precedent is never a small matter. Stare decisis—in English, the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a foundation stone of the rule of law.’ Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 15). Application of that doctrine, although ‘not an inexorable command,’ is the ‘preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 –828 (1991). It also reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”

It’s asserted here in Dobbs, and cited in Kimble, where it’s also asserted. An assertion that’s supported by a citation of the same assertion isn’t an argument, but this is essentially a tautology. To “stand by yesterday’s decisions” is to avoid “relitigation” of the issues in those decisions.

These claims are true by definition:

• “[Stare decisis] ‘reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents,’”
• “[Stare decisis] ‘sav[es] parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.’”