As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 1 of 3

Sentence 1 of 2

This sentence has three claims—one of which being the whole sentence:

“Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, it contends that the ‘constitutional tradition’ is ‘not captured whole at a single moment,’ and that its ‘meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents.’ Post, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The claims:

• “Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, it contends that the ‘constitutional tradition’ is ‘not captured whole at a single moment,’ and that its ‘meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents.’”
• “[T]he dissent cannot argue that the abortion right is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
• The dissent “contends that the ‘constitutional tradition’ is ‘not captured whole at a single moment,’ and that its ‘meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents.’”

The first claim is a bit of mind-reading. It asserts that the reason the dissent makes the third claim is because of the second claim. Maybe. But even if we can be sure about the motives of the dissenters, the second claim remains undetermined, so the first claim is also undetermined.

As for the third claim—here is the dissent at page 18:

“The majority wishes people to think there are but two alternatives: (1) accept the original applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and no others, or (2) surrender to judges’ ‘own ardent views,’ ungrounded in law, about the ‘liberty that Americans should enjoy.’ Ante, at 14. At least, that idea is what the majority sometimes tries to convey. At other times, the majority (or, rather, most of it) tries to assure the public that it has no designs on rights (for example, to contraception) that arose only in the back half of the 20th century—in other words, that it is happy to pick and choose, in accord with individual preferences. See ante, at 32, 66, 71–72; ante, at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); but see ante, at 3 (Thomas, J., concurring). But that is a matter we discuss later. See infra, at 24–29. For now, our point is different: It is that applications of liberty and equality can evolve while remaining grounded in constitutional principles, constitutional history, and constitutional precedents. The second Justice Harlan discussed how to strike the right balance when he explained why he would have invalidated a State’s ban on contraceptive use. Judges, he said, are not ‘free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.’ Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Yet they also must recognize that the constitutional ‘tradition’ of this country is not captured whole at a single moment. Ibid. Rather, its meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents—each looking to the last and each seeking to apply the Constitution’s most fundamental commitments to new conditions. That is why Americans, to go back to Obergefell’s example, have a right to marry across racial lines. And it is why, to go back to Justice Harlan’s case, Americans have a right to use contraceptives so they can choose for themselves whether to have children.

The Dobbs majority seems to be blowing past an entire argument to pick some phrases out to address, but as usual I might be misreading it. Also, the phrases Dobbs picks out of the dissent seem to be taken from another dissent in Poe v. Ullman, where the ideas here might have more context. Either way (or both ways), this requires more investigation.

So we have three undetermined claims:

• “Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, it contends that the ‘constitutional tradition’ is ‘not captured whole at a single moment,’ and that its ‘meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents.’”
• “[T]he dissent cannot argue that the abortion right is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
• The dissent “contends that the ‘constitutional tradition’ is ‘not captured whole at a single moment,’ and that its ‘meaning gains content from the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial precedents.’”