As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 2 of 3

Sentence 3 of 3

This sentence has four claims:

“But despite the dissent’s professed fidelity to stare decisis, it fails to seriously engage with that important precedent—which it cannot possibly satisfy.”

The claims:

• “[T]he dissent[] professe[s] fidelity to stare decisis.”
• “[T]hat an unenumerated right be ‘“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”’ before it can be recognized as a component of the ‘liberty’ protected in the Due Process Clause” is an “important precedent.”
• “[The dissent] fails to seriously engage with that important precedent.”
• “[The dissent] cannot possibly satisfy [that important precedent].”

The first of these claims is true, expressed in the first section of the dissent:

“One piece of evidence on that score seems especially salient: The majority’s cavalier approach to overturning this Court’s precedents. Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a foundation stone of the rule of law: that things decided should stay decided unless there is a very good reason for change. It is a doctrine of judicial modesty and humility. Those qualities are not evident in today’s opinion. The majority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and society it sets off. Roe and Casey have been the law of the land for decades, shaping women’s expectations of their choices when an unplanned pregnancy occurs. Women have relied on the availability of abortion both in structuring their relationships and in planning their lives. The legal framework Roe and Casey developed to balance the competing interests in this sphere has proved workable in courts across the country. No recent developments, in either law or fact, have eroded or cast doubt on those precedents. Nothing, in short, has changed. Indeed, the Court in Casey already found all of that to be true. Casey is a precedent about precedent. It reviewed the same arguments made here in support of overruling Roe, and it found that doing so was not warranted. The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only: because the composition of this Court has changed. Stare decisis, this Court has often said, ‘contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process’ by ensuring that decisions are ‘founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.’ Payne v. Ten-nessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986). Today, the proclivities of individuals rule. The Court departs from its obligation to faithfully and impartially apply the law. We dissent.

The other three claims will take some digging to determine, so we have one true claim:

• “[T]he dissent[] professe[s] fidelity to stare decisis.”

And three undetermined claims:

• “[T]hat an unenumerated right be ‘“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”’ before it can be recognized as a component of the ‘liberty’ protected in the Due Process Clause” is an “important precedent.”
• “[The dissent] fails to seriously engage with that important precedent.”
• “[The dissent] cannot possibly satisfy [that important precedent].”