As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

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Part D opens with a single claim:

“The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a constitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a ‘“deeply rooted”’ one, ‘“in this Nation’s history and tradition.”’ Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721; see post, at 12–14 (joint opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.).”

That’s just one claim with a couple of citations. Here’s the claim:

• “The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a constitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a ‘“deeply rooted”’ one, ‘“in this Nation’s history and tradition.”’”

Not just candid, but very candid. Where does this fit into our scheme of Ordered Candor?

Here’s Glucksberg (starting at the end of page 720):

“Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ id., at 503 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”), and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,’ Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).

That’s a familiar passage. Glucksberg definitely says that. But that’s not critical to the truth value of the claim being made by Dobbs. Here’s the relevant passage in the dissent:

“The majority makes this change based on a single question: Did the reproductive right recognized in Roe and Casey exist in ‘1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified’? Ante, at 23. The majority says (and with this much we agree) that the answer to this question is no: In 1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy, and no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment provided one.

This is a true claim:

• “The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a constitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a ‘“deeply rooted”’ one, ‘“in this Nation’s history and tradition.”’”

Just for fun, here’s the rest of what the dissent had to say on pages 12 to 14:

“Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some later and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes back as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century. See ante, at 17. But that turns out to be wheel-spinning. First, it is not clear what relevance such early history should have, even to the majority. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 26) (“Historical evidence that long predates [ratification] may not illuminate the scope of the right”). If the early history obviously supported abortion rights, the majority would no doubt say that only the views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers are germane. See ibid. (It is “better not to go too far back into antiquity,” except if olden “law survived to become our Founders’ law”). Second—and embarrassingly for the majority—early law in fact does provide some support for abortion rights. Common-law authorities did not treat abortion as a crime before “quickening”—the point when the fetus moved in the womb.2 And early American law followed the common-law rule.3 So the criminal law of that early time might be taken as roughly consonant with Roe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abortions. Better, then, to move forward in time. On the other side of 1868, the majority occasionally notes that many States barred abortion up to the time of Roe. See ante, at 24, 36. That is convenient for the majority, but it is window dressing. As the same majority (plus one) just informed us, ‘post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are inconsistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.’ New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc., 597 U.S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 27–28). Had the pre-Roe liberalization of abortion laws occurred more quickly and more widely in the 20th century, the majority would say (once again) that only the ratifiers’ views are germane.

“The majority’s core legal postulate, then, is that we in the 21st century must read the Fourteenth Amendment just as its ratifiers did. And that is indeed what the majority emphasizes over and over again. See ante, at 47 (“[T]he most important historical fact [is] how the States regulated abortion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); see also ante, at 5, 16, and n. 24, 23, 25, 28. If the ratifiers did not understand something as central to freedom, then neither can we. Or said more particularly: If those people did not understand reproductive rights as part of the guarantee of liberty conferred in the Fourteenth Amendment, then those rights do not exist.

“As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just preceding sentence. We referred there to the ‘people’ who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment: What rights did those ‘people’ have in their heads at the time? But, of course, ‘people’ did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Men did. So it is perhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not perfectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for women’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal members of our Nation. Indeed, the ratifiers—both in 1868 and when the original Constitution was approved in 1788—did not understand women as full members of the community embraced by the phrase ‘We the People.’ In 1868, the first wave of American feminists were explicitly told—of course by men—that it was not their time to seek constitutional protections. (Women would not get even the vote for another half-century.) To be sure, most women in 1868 also had a foreshortened view of their rights: If most men could not then imagine giving women control over their bodies, most women could not imagine having that kind of autonomy. But that takes away nothing from the core point. Those responsible for the original Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and did not recognize women’s rights. When the majority says that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may also check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class citizenship.