As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 1 of 4

Sentence 1 of 3

This sentence contains at least four claims:

“In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s claim (which we accept for the sake of argument) that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’ 505 U.S., at 848.”

Here are the claims I identified:

• “In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s claim.”
• “[W]e accept for the sake of argument [Casey’s claim] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”
• “Casey’s claim [is] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”
• “'[T]he specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”

One at a time. Here’s claim #1:

• “In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s claim.”

I’m sure this is true, but it’s going to take some thought. I’ll leave it undetermined for now.

Claim #2

• “[W]e accept for the sake of argument [Casey’s claim] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”

Okay, cool. You accept that. I have to take your word for that, so this is true.

Claim #3

• “Casey’s claim [is] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”

Here that passage is in Casey, where the Court uses Justice Harlan for support:

“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See U.S. Const., Amend. 9. As the second Justice Harlan recognized:

‘[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.’ Poe v. Ullman, supra, 367 U.S., at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1777 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).

Casey makes this point. This claim is true.

Claim #4:

• “'[T]he specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”

This will take some actual analysis, and that’s not what I’m doing at the moment. This is undetermined.

That leaves us with two undetermined claims:

• “In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s claim.”
• “'[T]he specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”

And two true claims:

• “[W]e accept for the sake of argument [Casey’s claim] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”
• “Casey’s claim [is] that ‘the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’ do not ‘mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.’”