As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 6 of 6

Sentence 4 of 4

This section ends with a two-claim sentence:

“They do not support the right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token, our conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.”

Here are the claims:

• “They do not support the right to obtain an abortion.”
• “[O]ur conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.”

On the first claim:

• “They do not support the right to obtain an abortion.”

The argument here seems to be that even though a broader right to privacy derived from the Fourteenth Amendment supports those earlier decisions, that broader right and those decisions do not support abortion because abortion involves the destruction of a fetus/unborn child/MacGuffin. If that case has been made in this document that accomplishment is in the many details that I’ve not examined, so this has to remain undetermined for now.

As for the second claim:

• “[O]ur conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.”

This claim is difficult to take seriously for a couple of reasons. One reason is that much of the section we’ve just covered is concerned with questioning whether there is a broader right to privacy conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that doubt jeopardizes all of the rights established by the decisions Roe and Casey cite, and which the Dobbs Court claims are not in danger here.

The second reason is the oft-discussed passage in Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence, which reads:

“The Court today declines to disturb substantive due process jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application in other, specific contexts. Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain contraceptives)1*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage), are not at issue. The Court’s abortion cases are unique, see ante, at 31–32, 66, 71–72, and no party has asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDonald, 561 U.S., at 813 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Thus, I agree that “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Ante, at 66.

“For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any substantive due process decision is ‘demonstrably erroneous,’ Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to “correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 9).

I don’t think Clarence is on board with the majority’s assurances. And he cited no less an authority than himself! How fun for him.

Also, if the Dobbs Court accepts the validity of those previous decisions and the only reason abortion doesn’t join them is the status of the fetus, how is this case not about the status of the fetus?

These claims are undetermined:

• “They do not support the right to obtain an abortion.”
• “[O]ur conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.”