As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

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The second sentence in this section makes two claims based on the previous sentence:

“Roe termed this a right to privacy, 410 U.S., at 154, and Casey described it as the freedom to make ‘intimate and personal choices’ that are ‘central to personal dignity and autonomy,’ 505 U.S., at 851.”

Here are the two claims:

• “Roe termed this [broader entrenched right] a right to privacy.”
• “Casey described [the broader entrenched right] as the freedom to make ‘intimate and personal choices’ that are ‘central to personal dignity and autonomy.’”

So let’s check Roe and Casey to see what the cited passages have to say. Here’s Roe on page 154, with citations removed (I’m actually going to start on 153 and end on 155):

“The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court’s decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.

“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

“We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the District Court in the present case, have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights.

“Others have sustained state statutes.

“Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute, and is subject to some limitations; and that, at some point, the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach.

This shows that Roe definitely discusses the right to privacy applying to abortion, so that much is true. That claim is true. I have another observation to make about the Roe citation, but let’s look at Casey on page 851 first:

“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S., at 685, 97 S.Ct., at 2016. Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, 405 U.S., at 453, 92 S.Ct., at 1038 (emphasis in original). Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

The second claim is true also. The passage exists in Casey exactly as advertised in Dobbs. We have two true claims:

• “Roe termed this [broader entrenched right] a right to privacy.”
• “Casey described [the broader entrenched right] as the freedom to make ‘intimate and personal choices’ that are ‘central to personal dignity and autonomy.’”

On the point of the Roe claim, though, I was struck by the number of cases cited for this single point. One claim that opponents of Roe have made, and which gets little pushback from Roe supporters, is that the Court invented this right out of thin air. That there was no right to privacy and suddenly there was, just because the Roe Court wanted one. If that’s the case, though, what the hell is in all of these cases that warranted their citation in this passage? That definitely needs investigation at some point. Here are the citations I’m talking about:

• Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905) (vaccination);
• Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927) ( sterilization).
• Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56;
• Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730;
• Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (ND Ga.1970), appeal decided today, post, p. 179;
• Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill.1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-105;
• Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (Kan.1972);
• YWCA v. Kuler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972);
• Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (ED Wis.1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U. S. 1 (1970);
• People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970);
• State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2D 431 (Fla.1972).
• Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED Ky.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256;
• Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La.1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-42;
• Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-92;
• Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970);
• Doe v. Rampton (Utah 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-5666;
• Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. ___, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972);
• Spears v. State, 257 So. 2D 876 (Miss. 1972);
• State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-631.