As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 6 of 11

Sentence 2 of 4

This sentence contains three claims:

“But the insistence on quickening was not universal, see Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa., at 633; State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630, 632 (1880), and regardless, the fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the authority to do so.”

The claims:

• “[T]he insistence on quickening was not universal.”
• “[M]any States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions.”
• “[T]he fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the authority to do so.”

The first claim seems to be true. Mills doesn’t pop up immediately in a Google search, but State v. Slagle does, and I found its text here. Also, Slagle cites Mills in making the point that Dobbs claims it does.

The relevant passage would seem to be this one:

“In some of the states it has been held that in the absence of any statute the offence [offense] can only be perpetrated upon a woman so far advanced in gestation as to be quick with child, and this requirement is met in the present bill. But we are not disposed thus to restrict the criminal act, but to hold that it may be committed at any stage of pregnancy. It was determined by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Penn. State Rep., 631, and we quote the clear and forcible language in which the principle is announced in the opinion of COULTER, J.: ‘It is a flagrant crime at common law to attempt to procure the miscarriage or abortion of the woman because it interferes with and violates the mysteries of nature in the process by which the human race is propagated and continued. It is a crime against nature which obstructs the fountains of life and therefore it is punished. The next error assigned is that it ought to have been charged in the count that the woman had become quick. But although it has been so held in Massachusetts and in some other states, it is not, I apprehend, the law in Pennsylvania, and never ought to have been the law anywhere. It is not the murder of a living child which constitutes the offence [offense], but the destruction of gestation by wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is instinct with embryo life and gestation has begun, the crime may be perpetrated.’” (Emphasis mine.)

Coulter (in Mills, cited here in Slagle, then Dobbs, and now me) then makes an assertion that isn’t relevant to the claim in this Dobbs sentence, but I think it’s interesting and worth having around for later reference:

“It is not the murder of a living child which constitutes the offence [offense], but the destruction of gestation by wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is instinct with embryo life and gestation has begun, the crime may be perpetrated.“

The second claim in this sentence is likely true, but will require some checking. The third is a pretty simple matter of logic, and by virtue of that logic it is true. The first statement does not lead necessarily to the second statement, and to insist otherwise would be a non sequitur.

So I see one undetermined claim:

• “[M]any States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions.”

And two true claims:

• “[T]he insistence on quickening was not universal.”
• “[T]he fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the authority to do so.”