As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 2 of 6

Sentence 2 of 2

The second sentence in this paragraph has two claims:

“But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law, noting that ‘to many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person in being.’ Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans, 49 N.Y., at 89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850); Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321–322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789).”

Here are the claims:

• “But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law.”
• “But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule [. . .] not[es] that ‘to many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person in being.'”

These claims deserve more than just a glance, so I’ll leave them undetermined for now. Here are the sources to look at first when I get there:

• Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129);
• Evans, 49 N.Y., at 89;
• Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850);
• Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849);
• Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834);
• Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321–322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789).

Two undetermined claims:

• “But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law.”
• “But the case on which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule [. . .] not[es] that ‘to many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person in being.’