As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 2 of 6

Sentence 1 of 2

The next paragraph opens with a sentence consisting of one claim:

“The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the basis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quickening the common law did not regard a fetus ‘as having a “separate and independent existence.”’ Brief for United States 26 (quoting Parker, 50 Mass., at 266).”

In the interest of moving along, I’m going to leave this undetermined. I’ll be honest—I’m kind of at a loss as to how to find this. I’ll figure it out later if it comes to that. This is a pretty significant point in the context of history and tradition, even if the history and tradition line of argument seems pretty weak.

This is undetermined for now:

• “The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the basis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quickening the common law did not regard a fetus ‘as having a “separate and independent existence.”’”