As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.
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This next section starts to lay out the legal history of abortion in more specific terms—beginning hundreds of years before the founding of the United States:
“We begin with the common law, under which abortion was a crime at least after “quickening”—i.e., the first felt movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.” 24
I see three claims in this sentence, with a couple more in end note 24. Here’s what the sentence contains:
- “We begin with the common law.”
- “[U]nder [the common law] abortion was a crime at least after “quickening.”
- Quickening is “the first felt movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.”
The first claim of the sentence is more compositional logistics than argument, but it’s a claim:
“We begin with the common law.”
Since the common law is discussed in this sentence, and this is the beginning, I’m going to declare this claim true. On to the substance:
“[U]nder [the common law] abortion was a crime at least after “quickening.”
I’m interested to see how they establish this, but it will take some investigation. For now it’s undetermined. Which brings us to the explanatory portion of the sentence:
Quickening is “the first felt movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.”
This is how I understand “quickening,” and I’m pretty sure that it’s at least one interpretation of what it meant to people hundreds of years ago. What I don’t know off the top of my head, and what I won’t know without at least a survey of historical materials, is whether it’s the only interpretation or whether it’s a complete accounting of what it meant. End note 24 (indicated at the end of this sentence) admits this before setting it aside as irrelevant:
The exact meaning of “quickening” is subject to some debate. Compare Brief for Scholars of Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae 12–14, and n. 32 (emphasis deleted) (“‘a quick child’” meant simply a “live” child, and under the era’s outdated knowledge of embryology, a fetus was thought to become “quick” at around the sixth week of pregnancy), with Brief for American Historical Association et al. As Amici Curiae 6, n. 2 (“quick” and “quickening” consistently meant “the woman’s perception of fetal movement”). We need not wade into this debate. First, it suffices for present purposes to show that abortion was criminal by at least the 16th or 18th week of pregnancy. Second, as we will show, during the relevant period—i.e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See infra, at 21–25.
This presents us with two more relevant claims in the end note:
“[A]bortion was criminal by at least the 16th or 18th week of pregnancy.”
I’m interested to see how this is established. By assertion? By reasoned argument? Who determined this, under what authority, and in what context? I guess we’ll have to wait and see if those questions (and many more) are addressed in this decision, or if we’ll have to consult outside sources.
The second claim in this note is more a statement of intent:
“[W]e will show [that] during the relevant period—i.e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy.”
They intend to make this case on pages 21 to 25 of this decision. So we have that to look forward to.
In the end, this has produced five claims, the first of which is true and the remainder to be determined later:
True:
- “We begin with the common law.”
Undetermined:
- “[U]nder [the common law] abortion was a crime at least after “quickening.”
- Quickening is “the first felt movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.”
- “[A]bortion was criminal by at least the 16th or 18th week of pregnancy.”
- “[W]e will show [that] during the relevant period—i.e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy.”
