As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 8 of 9

Sentence 2 of 4

On the surface the next sentence seems innocuous, but there’s a sly maneuver happening in this single claim:

“That is why the Court has long been ‘reluctant’ to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992).”

It’s certainly a reason to be careful, and this is one way to be careful. There are many ways to guard against legislating for preference rather than for effective law, but this isn’t the only one.

Before I get too far ahead of myself, let’s see what Collins v. Harker Heights has to say:

“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225-226 (1985). The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field. It is important, therefore, to focus on the allegations in the complaint to determine how petitioner describes the constitutional right at stake and what the city allegedly did to deprive her husband of that right.”

It’s clear that Collins also states that the Court is “reluctant” in this regard, and ties that reluctance to “[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint,” which seems related to not privileging one’s preferences when deciding cases. That part isn’t a one-to-one match, though, so there’s certainly room for exploration in this claim.

But for now, this claim is true:

• “That is why the Court has long been ‘reluctant’ to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution.”