As always, you can find the Dobbs v. Jackson decision here.

Paragraph 7 of 9

Sentence 1 of 4

The next sentence is three claims:

“Historical inquiries of this nature are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause because the term “liberty” alone provides little guidance.”

Here they are separated:

1. “Historical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”
2. “[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance.”
3. “[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance,” so “[h]istorical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”

I’ve reversed the order of the third claim, which is a combination of the other two, just for a different look:

In reverse order, this sentence is essentially a conditional syllogism. If A, then B. A. Therefore, B. And the first claim is pretty mushy.

“[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance.”

It’s an assertion made up of vague components. Even in the Fourteenth Amendment, the word “liberty” doesn’t appear in isolation, so “the term ‘liberty’ alone” is a strange phrase. No word provides much guidance sitting by itself, but Jackson Women’s Health Organization isn’t just screaming “liberty” at the Court. They’re providing context. Or, if you prefer . . . guidance.

The second claim is another assertion that depends on ideas that haven’t been established:

“Historical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”

History is useful in assessing new ideas because history provides examples of ideas that have been tried, but the ideas of history are more limited than what is currently available simply because people learn as time passes. More people get involved and more information is brought to bear, which exposes the strengths and weaknesses of those historical ideas. There’s a phrase in philosophy that comes to mind: “necessary but not sufficient.” Since the last paragraph demonstrated that Dobbs hasn’t earned the “necessary” part of this equation, historical inquiry occupies a space more like “useful but not sufficient.”

As for the third claim—the Voltron of assertions—there’s no sense to be made of it.

“[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance,” so “[h]istorical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”

Maybe something later in this paragraph or this section will justify these assertions, but to this point the claims are all just floating there unanchored.

These three claims are undetermined:

• “Historical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”
• “[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance.”
• “[T]he term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance,” so “[h]istorical inquiries [such as the one in Glucksberg] are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”